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Between facts and myth: Karl Jaspers and the actuality
of the axial age
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Karl Jaspers’s axial age thesis refers to a demythologizing revolution in worldviews
that took place in the first millennium BCE. Although his philosophy has been pejora-
tively described as ‘Werk ohne Wirkung’, this idea has attracted considerable scholarly
attention in recent years. This article aims to critically engage with the very notion of
the axial age by looking first at contextual issues, then at the key claims Jaspers makes,
before examining the actuality of the thesis and the problem of its characterization as
an ‘age’. The conclusion is that Jaspers’s attempt to unify the complex processes of
demythologization under the notion of the axial age has produced a myth, and that this
continues to have consequences today.
Keywords: axial age; Karl Jaspers; transcendence; religion; Jürgen Habermas
‘Du bleibst am Ursprung.
Ursprung ist das Ziel’
– Karl Kraus
Introduction
The idea of the axial age has garnered increasing attention amongst philosophers and
social scientists in recent years and has even entered more mainstream discussions.1 As a
concept, it is meant to name a fundamental shift in cognitive orientation that took place in
various locations across ancient Eurasia around 500 BCE. This shift is supposed to
constitute a rupture with previous mythological forms of consciousness and to provide
the primary basis for all subsequent developments in world history; both the major world
religions and philosophy itself have, as Jürgen Habermas has put it, a ‘shared origin’ in
this period.2 The current interest in this alleged epoch is by no means disinterested. As the
Egyptologist Jan Assmann has recently stated, the axial age belongs to the discourse of
modernity: it is the ‘quest for the roots of modernity’.3 The appeal of this non-Eurocentric
historical narrative is clearly related to the globalized conditions of contemporary socie-
ties. In claiming that the plurality of world religions that constitute or have constituted the
cultural identities of the majority of people can be identified as part of the same epochal
shift, it is possible to posit some sort of original unity in order to facilitate future
communicative interaction and undercut the apparent inevitability of a clash of
civilizations.4 Viewed in this way, the axial age thesis seems to sit uneasily between
history and normative theory: it seeks to describe a common origin in order to prescribe a
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future solidarity. In this regard, and with a certain irony, it seems as though the idea of the
axial age as a single demythologizing turn instantiated across different parts of ancient
Eurasia bears affinity with that most common of myths, the myth of origin.
The idea of the axial age or period (die Achsenzeit) is first developed by the
existentialist philosopher Karl Jaspers as the empirical basis for a theory of universal
history.5 Jaspers is frequently referred to in contemporary discussions of the notion of the
axial age. Yet too little attention has been paid to his explication of the idea. I wish to
examine Jaspers’s original articulation of the thesis and to draw together some of the
current research on this theme. The aim is not only to emphasize the problems inherent in
Jaspers’s notion of the axial age, but also, taking the recent work of Habermas as an
example, to show that these problems persist in its philosophical deployment. The
analysis will first look at the prehistory and context of the idea of the axial age in the
work of Jaspers. It will then closely examine some of the key claims Jaspers makes in the
text itself. A key problem for Jaspers’s approach lies in the combination of existential
notions of selfhood and interiority with the positivity necessitated by historical analysis.
His account often seems vague when it comes to drawing a relation between these aspects;
it falls between two stools, philosophy and historical sociology. The analysis of Jaspers’s
text will be followed by some more general criticism concerning the actuality of the
concept and the limits of its continued deployment.
Precursors and context
Reflections on the parallel emergence of prophets, sages and philosophers of world
historical significance long precede Jaspers’s explication of the axial age thesis. Jaspers
himself identifies two precursors in the nineteenth century, Ernst von Lasaulx and Viktor
von Strauss, and one in the twentieth, Alfred Weber.6 He provides a citation from a Lao-
tse commentary of 1870 in which Strauss identifies Confucius and Lao-tse with ‘a strange
movement of the spirit [that] passed through all civilised people’, which includes the
prophets in Israel, the Pre-Socratics in Greece, Zarathustra in Persia and Sakyamuni in
Greece.7 Lasaulx makes a similar claim concerning the simultaneous emergence of such
‘reformers’ in Persia, China, India, Israel and Greece (but also Numa in Rome) around
600 BCE.8 These claims anticipate those later made by Jaspers about the period in a
significant manner. Nevertheless, Lasaulx and Strauss speak in terms of a ‘strange
concurrence’ and ‘mysterious laws’, respectively.9 It is worth bearing in mind that
Strauss is an author of extant hymns whose interest in the pre-Christian era was motivated
by a negative assessment of D. F. Strauss’s Das Leben Jesu, whereas the Catholic Lasaulx
sought, as Hans Joas claims, ‘to reconstitute a Christian perspective in the writing of
universal history’.10
While some have speculated that Vico’s Scienza Nuova is the earliest precursor,11 a more
convincing claim, made by Jan Assmann, is that the ‘long prehistory’ of the concept finds its
earliest attestation in the work of the eighteenth century French Orientalist, Abraham
Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron.12 Based on the same source, Hans Joas maintains that, already
in 1771, the ‘deeply Catholic’ Anquetil-Duperron ‘claimed that the ideas articulated by
Zoroaster probably in the sixth century BCE were part of a more general “revolution” in
different parts of the world’.13 If nothing else, this shows that notions akin to the axial age
appeared plausible to scholars of ‘the Orient’ long before they entered general discourse. Yet,
and this is the central claim Joas makes, it also seems that the appeal of such a thesis is bound
up with the religious convictions of these interpreters.
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It is important to stress that a significant formative influence on Jaspers was Max
Weber, with whom he was closely acquainted from his time in Heidelberg.14 In the years
prior to his death, Weber had written extensively on Indian and Chinese religion as well as
on Ancient Judaism. He speaks loosely of a ‘prophetic age’ in Israel, Babylon, China,
India and Greece between 800 and 500 BCE.15 Hans Joas claims that for Weber this era of
prophets comprises ‘the crucial event in the history of religion – the turning point between
tens of thousands of years of “magical” religion and the new age of post-magical
“salvation religions”’.16 Yet although Weber was a relatively sober thinker – indeed one
who purported to be ‘religiously tone-deaf’17 – Joas identifies a surreptitious Protestant
polemic within his work whereby Catholic sacrament is identified with pre-axial magic. If
one accepts this and Weber’s overriding interest in the uniqueness of the Occident, the
idea of a decisive break achieved in the Eurasian ‘prophetic age’ is enmeshed in a
narrative that is nevertheless at once Protestant and Eurocentric.
Recent commentators have also suggested that Jaspers draws more heavily on Alfred
Weber’s ‘notion of a (near-) global spiritual turning’ than he himself admits.18 Citing his
Kulturgeschichte als Kultursoziologie (1935), Torpey and Boy convincingly demonstrate
that this text ‘contained the axial thesis in nuce’.19 Unlike the previous examples, Alfred
Weber provides a hypothesis as to why these changes occurred concurrently: ‘the pene-
tration of the nations of charioteers and horsemen from Central Asia’ into China, India
and ‘the West’ are supposed to have had ‘analogous consequences in all three regions’.20
Yet while Weber wishes to posit the influx of equestrian warriors as a primary cause of the
shift in worldviews, Jaspers only entertains such a thesis insofar as it ‘demonstrates the
existence of real uniformity within the Eurasian bloc’.21 Ultimately Jaspers thinks this
may be a necessary causal factor, but it is not sufficient to explain the ‘remarkable and all-
embracing’ achievements of the axial age. Torpey and Boy spell out Jaspers’s unwilling-
ness to commit to a sociological explanation for the parallel developments in the three
regions and emphasize his suggestion of an ‘immaterial cause … a movement of the
human spirit that is not accounted for by sociological factors such as social actors,
organizations, or institutions’.22 It now seems clear that while there is robust evidence
as to the existence of the Reiter–Volker, their incursions appear too early to provide the
explanatory force Alfred Weber ascribes them.23 But if better historical knowledge has
proved Jaspers’s hesitancy correct in this regard, this can hardly be described as a virtue of
his analysis. As the claim by Torpey and Boy suggests, Jaspers’s interest in spiritual or
immaterial factors makes his approach to history rather peculiar.
While the general idea of a concurrent change in worldviews in various locations in
China, India and the West is not new, examining the context within which Jaspers
articulates it may aid in determining its specificity. It is noteworthy, then, that Jaspers
first presents the idea of the ‘Axial Age’ (l’époque-axe) at the inaugural meeting of
Rencontres internationales, which was held in Geneva in 1946 on the topic, ‘What Is
Europe?’24 Here, he addresses the need for Europe to lose any ‘absolute’ sense of its
importance and suggests that the distinctly European advances of modernity pale in
comparison to ‘the parallel evolution of three independent and great spiritualities’.25
Jaspers continues: ‘For the Christian, it is Christ who represents the axis of universal
history … But from an empirical point of view – which is not by necessity in conflict with
religious belief – the axis of world history is situated in the period between 800 to
200 BC’.26
The introduction of this rather global concept in a conference held on European
identity at the end of the Second World War suggests that Jaspers is attempting to
undermine the Eurocentric emphasis of previous approaches to historiography.
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 317
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Nevertheless, the idea does not find its full articulation until several years later in The
Origin and Goal of History.27 With this ambitious title, Jaspers announces nothing less
than a postulate of historical reason or ‘article of faith’: ‘mankind has one single origin
and one goal’.28 These notions remain at the level of faith because they are outside the
scope of human experience.29 Instead of wishing to abandon or radically overhaul the
theory of universal history in the wake of the catastrophes of totalitarianism, war and the
death camps, Jaspers’s intention is to provide it with new foundations. As a concept that
purports to unite three distinct regions, the axial age is deemed capable of providing an
empirical re-grounding for the project of universal history. This is significant because
Jaspers wants to avoid two tendencies that can characterize the philosophical under-
pinnings of historiography. On the one hand, traditional approaches to the philosophy
of history can seem both Eurocentric and Christian in character. In making sense of the
preconditions for the modern age, earlier historians have often ascribed too much sig-
nificance to Jerusalem and Athens. Jaspers holds such conceptions of history to be too
particularistic: ‘World history was the history of the West’.30 On the other hand, a
positivist conception of history would lack the unifying, teleological emphasis that
Jaspers thinks must be postulated if one is to grasp the meaning of history or attribute
significance: ‘positivism aimed at according equal rights to all men … Battles between
negroes in the Sudan were on the same historical plane as Marathon and Salamis’.31 Thus,
if historicism is blind to historical processes that did not directly lead to European
modernity, positivism suffers a dearth of the conceptual resources necessary for discerning
significance and articulating a cohesive narrative. Jaspers seeks to chart a course between
these twin perils:
The meaning of empirical history, so far as it is empirically accessible – whether it possesses
such a meaning, or whether human beings only attribute one to it – we can only grasp when
guided by the idea of the unity of the whole of history. We shall examine empirical facts in
order to see to what extent they are in accordance with such an idea of unity or how far they
absolutely contradict it.32
In conceiving of the central tenet of his philosophy of history as an article of faith and
nonetheless proposing the empirical basis of such a view of history, Jaspers lets slip a
certain tension between the existential suppositions of his thought and the more staid
demand for empirical positivity necessitated by his wish to avoid the Eurocentric bias of
previous philosophies of history. This desire to move away from accounts of universal
history that look partisan at the global level can be seen as Jaspers’s attempt to present a
pluralistic vision of humanity in the wake of the atrocities associated with the war,
specifically those linked to a belief in a non-universal historical destiny. While one cannot
fault Jaspers’s intentions, it remains open to question whether the idea of historical
analysis being guided by faith is not itself part of the problem.
In the beginning of the first chapter of the book – where the main account of the axial
age is given – Jaspers rearticulates the principal problem of the philosophy of history as
being linked to its overwhelmingly Christian character. He identifies a line of historical
thinking running from Augustine to Hegel which ‘visualised the movement of God
through history’.33 From this perspective, the Christian kerygma is deemed an incon-
trovertible historical demarcation. Jaspers indirectly cites Hegel as the last great exemplar
of this tradition and one for whom the ‘appearance of the Son of God is the axis of world
history’.34 At a formal level, our measurement of historical time is obviously related to
Christianity. Yet the idea that Christ constitutes an ‘axis of world history’ in a more
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substantial sense, which is the claim Jaspers attributes to Hegel,35 is problematic because
such a conception of history obviously cannot be valid for those whose beliefs differ.36
Thus, while the Christian view of history is universal in scope, it is certainly not universal
in appeal: ‘the Christian faith is only one faith, not the faith of mankind’.37 What remains
significant is that the temporal structure of Christianity for believers, namely, one in which
a prehistory leads to an epochal event which both breaks from this past and is the point of
reference for future developments, is deemed to be an important resource for the devel-
opment of a universal history. In order to overcome the problematic aspect of the Christian
picture, it seems, what is required is a compelling account that relies on empirical
evidence rather than a specific faith.
An axis of world history, if such a thing exists, would have to be discovered empirically, as a
fact capable of being accepted as such by all men, Christians included. This axis would be
situated at the point in history which gave birth to everything which since then man has been
able to be, the point most overwhelmingly fruitful in fashioning humanity; its character would
have to be, if not empirically cogent and evident, yet so convincing to empirical insight as to
give rise to a common frame of historical self-comprehension for all peoples – for the West,
for Asia, and for all men on earth without regard to particular articles of faith.38
Thus, on the basis of his faith in an origin and goal in history – that is, a single meaningful
overarching narrative – Jaspers seeks a historical focal point that is empirically plausible
and therefore acceptable in principle to the plurality of peoples. To this end he points to
the parallel emergence or religious and philosophical figures and texts as marking an
autochthonous but structurally similar cognitive shift that took place in China, India and
‘the West’ (i.e. Iran, Israel–Palestine and Greece) between 800 and 200 BCE.39
By looking at the precursors to Jaspers’s account of the axial age, it was possible to
show that the idea, if not the term itself, has had a long prehistory and that this was bound
up with certain other religious or Eurocentric claims. The post-war context within which
Jaspers develops the idea makes clear his more pluralistic approach. Jaspers wants to
stress the empirical basis of his approach in order to avoid the disguised theology of
previous forms of universal history. Nevertheless, there is something obscure about the
positivity of the evidence to which he appeals. As the above quotation makes clear with
its puzzling distinction between empirical cogency and empirical insight, Jaspers shies
away from a strong claim to validity. This was already seen in his unwillingness to affirm
Alfred Weber’s claim about the impact of equestrian warrior tribes. Jaspers’s caution
regarding empirical facts is understandable if what he seeks is evidence for an ‘article of
faith’, which in the context of his own existential philosophy would be therefore beyond
positive representation.40 Jaspers’s basic approach is thus guided by his immediate
historical context as well as by his own philosophical commitments. It will become
clearer that these commitments determine not only his general approach to the philosophy
of history, but also his interpretation of the material.
The key features of the axial age
It might be hoped that having articulated the need for an empirically grounded conception
of universal history, Jaspers would proceed by developing a rich account of the key
features of the axial age that would link together details from the different textual sources
into an illuminating constellation. Unfortunately, this is not the case; an effusive existen-
tialist jargon scatterguns statements, but becomes elusive with regard to anything as
prosaic as facts. Jaspers’s two most basic claims seem to be that for the first time
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D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ad
bo
ud
 U
niv
ers
ite
it N
ijm
eg
en
] a
t 0
7:2
0 2
4 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
transcendence became a human possibility and that the capacity to transcend brute
existence allowed for critical reflection on mythological or quasi-natural forms of author-
ity and sense-making practices. Yet Jaspers does not present straightforward arguments or
theses, so it will be necessary to skip along with his thoughts, commenting upon and
criticizing them where necessary.
Assmann holds that with his axial age thesis, Jaspers is making a claim regarding the
origin of ‘general consciousness’.41 It certainly seems that the capacity to take a kind of
speculative or reflective perspective from which to survey existence in general is assumed
to be characteristic of all the figures from the different regions:
What is new about this age, in all three areas of the world, is that man becomes conscious of
Being as a whole, of himself and his limitations. He experiences the terror of the world and his
own powerlessness. He asks radical questions. Face to face with the void he strives for liberation
and redemption. By consciously recognising his limits he sets himself the highest goals. He
experiences absoluteness in the depths of selfhood and in the lucidity of transcendence.42
The totality of existence comes into view and is reflected upon for the first time in the
axial period. Such a level of reflection seems to imply transcendence. Thus, Benjamin
Schwartz, one of the forerunners to the current discussion of the axial age thesis, claims
that the ‘common underlying element’ which might unite these emerging philosophical
and religious traditions is the ‘strain towards transcendence’.43 Nevertheless, it is simply
not clear why this necessitates ‘terror’, why such fear is conceived as a new feature of the
age, nor how the ‘void’ is applicable to all axial cases.44
It could be that the void in question is a chink within the formerly immanent (i.e.
mythic) framework, which enables the individual a reflexive space from which to survey the
whole. Or, it could be that this the gap that opens up after the individual goes beyond such a
nexus. Jaspers fails to clarify this issue. Nevertheless, the focus on selfhood makes us aware
that it is not simply consciousness of the whole, but a reflexive or second-order conscious-
ness that is in question. Thus, Jaspers also claims that ‘thinking became its own object’.45
As Charles Taylor articulates it, this form of reflexive cognition means that ‘the formulae we
use to describe or operate in the world themselves come under critical examination’.46
Taylor wants to link this to the idea of a moral revolution, which ‘disembeds us from the
cosmic sacred and posits a new relation to God, as [the] designer’ of a moral order oriented
towards ‘human flourishing’.47 An aspect of this idea will be explored a little later in the
discussion of critical reflection, but it is worth noting that – in view of the persistence of the
caste system in India48 – this can by no means be simply equated with the emergence of a
universal morality. The notion of transcendence or reflexivity might best be seen as the
emergence of a capacity. Such a conception of the axial age has been thematized in terms of
cognitive evolution by some thinkers in the recent debate. The emergence of a reflexive
consciousness in the axial age is the move from a mythic form of ‘cognitive governance’ to
a theoretic one.49 The transcendental breakthrough associated with the axial age leads both
to a consciousness of being as a whole and to self-consciousness. Yet Jaspers fails to
provide examples, and it is highly unclear how reflexive consciousness is to be applied in all
cases. Although the geometric proofs of Pythagoras can be considered second-order think-
ing, there is no evidence to suggest that those pre-Socratics who present cosmological
theories reflect on their own cognitive processes.50 Similarly, reflexivity for the Hebrew
prophets can only mean a reflective appropriation of a tradition within a given historical
context.
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The capacity for individual reflection is what is thought to have led to disagreement,
contestation and communication. Jaspers claims that the axial age allowed for experi-
mentation with the most ‘contradictory possibilities’.51 This may be generally true, but it
would be harder to apply it specifically to the prophetic tradition, for example, because,
while their writings exhibit their different personalities, the individual prophets can hardly
be thought to occupy radically different positions from one another.52 The notion of
conflict at the level of worldviews, which he terms ‘spiritual chaos’, is important and can
be thought to lead to the critical function of emerging consciousness:
hitherto unconsciously accepted ideas, customs and conditions were subjected to examina-
tion, questioned and liquidated. Everything was swept into the vortex. In so far as the
traditional substance still possessed vitality and reality, its manifestations were clarified and
thereby transmuted.53
Reflexive cognition is dissolvent of traditional ties to the extent that their arbitrary nature
is revealed and they can no longer function effectively. Thus, while Schwartz’s title refers
to the axial age as the ‘age of transcendence’,54 his contemporary Arnaldo Momigliano
sees it as ‘an age of criticism’.55 The dissolvent effect nascent consciousness has on
tradition does not mean it is abandoned – it can be refigured as Jaspers suggests. While no
examples are given, they certainly abound in Plato’s adaptations of myth and in the
heightened moral consciousness attested to in the prophetic engagement with
Deuteronomic law.56 Thus, the critical function ascribed to consciousness means Jaspers
views the axial age as one of radical demythologization because even where tradition was
being upheld and retained, its basis was transformed:
Rationality and rationally clarified experience launched a struggle against the myth (logos
against mythos); a further struggle developed for the transcendence of One God against non-
existence demons, and finally an ethical rebellion took place against the unreal figures of the
gods. Religion was rendered ethical, and the majesty of the deity was thereby increased. The
myth, on the other hand … was turned into parable.57
The emergence of a reflexive second-order consciousness leads to rationalization. Such a
process changes the function of myth. This changed of function is evident in Plato’s many
uses of myth as it is in Homer’s aesthetic restaging of mythic narratives in the Odyssey.
Whether in the latter case it is best explained as a result of second-order consciousness
will be returned to in due course. Nevertheless, for the moment it should be pointed out
that even though Jaspers conceives the axial age as a demythologizing revolution in
consciousness, he has also to admit that myth remained ‘the continued belief of the mass
of the people’.58 As Shmuel Eisenstadt notes, initially at least, it is only ‘small nuclei
of … cultural elites or of intellectuals [that] developed the new cosmologies’.59 For
Jaspers, the decisive break that these elites effect is conceived as a process of ‘spiritua-
lisation’ in which the ‘calm polarities’ of mythological thinking are transformed into the
‘disquiet of opposites and antinomies’.60
The relation between transcendence, tension and criticism is best articulated by
Eisenstadt’s claim that ‘in the axial age civilizations, the perception of a sharp disjunction
between the mundane and transmundane worlds developed’.61 This ‘chasm between the
transcendental and mundane’ is potentially bridged through the ‘reconstruction of human
behaviour’ on the basis of ‘higher moral precepts’.62 Nevertheless, it worth noting that
although Jaspers has emphasized the divisive and conflicted nature of the axial develop-
ments, he subsequently speaks of a speculative union, an ontology which is ‘without
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duality’ and features ‘the disappearance of the subject and the object, the coincidence of
opposites’.63 It might be that overcoming the division is based on activating higher moral
principles. Yet Jaspers’s examples – and these are the only concrete examples provided in
which multiple sources are related – suggest meditative flight rather than ethical zeal:
in soaring toward the idea, in the resignation of ataraxia, in the absorption of meditation, in
the knowledge of his self and the world as atman, in the experience of nirvana, in concord
with the tao, or in surrender to the will of God. These paths are widely divergent in their
conviction and dogma, but common to all of them is man’s reaching out beyond himself by
growing aware of himself within the whole of Being and the fact that he can tread them only
as an individual on his own …What was later called reason and personality was revealed for
the first time during the Axial Period.64
In pointing towards a series of actual doctrines found within axial age thinkers, Jaspers
finally makes us aware of axial characteristics that have some empirical foundation.
Nevertheless, simply taking these features as synonymous with subsequent cultural
developments suggests either anachronism or an ahistorical core to Jaspers’s conception
of universal history. It seems that the stress on individuality itself may in part come from
the survival of so many canonical texts attributed to individual authors from this period.
‘Hermits and wandering thinkers in China, ascetics in India, philosophers in Greece and
prophets in Israel all belong together, however much they differ from each other … Man
proved capable of contrasting himself inwardly with the entire universe’.65 If the cosmic
dualism was overcome, this was accomplished in the minds of individual thinkers. These
thinkers achieved a ‘step into universality’, but the age itself becomes less calm because
there occurs a jostling between such universals.66 Of course, this is only related to a
disproportionately small group of thinkers because a gulf separates ‘the peaks of human
potentiality and the crowd’, who were ‘unable to follow in their footsteps’.67 The
authentic few nonetheless open up new possibilities for the species: ‘The whole of
humanity took a great leap’.68
Jaspers claims that there is further correspondence between the different axial zones
insofar as there is a similarities between the social environments within which the
purportedly analogous developments took place. The chief characteristic is the co-
existence of small city- and nation-states in the three axial regions. The axial thinkers
are not conceived as sedentary scribes, but as dynamic individuals who moved from place
to place or encountered different positions within bustling cities. Jaspers contrasts the
dynamism and potential volatility of the small states with the obdurate ‘spiritual condi-
tions’ of the major civilizations.69 Apparently, the lack of spiritual progress made in these
older civilizations meant that the potential for development ‘did not enter consciousness’,
whereas the rapid changes in worldview that smaller states underwent ‘reaches
consciousness’.70 This leads to reflection on history and an awareness of the newness
and precariousness of their age. Nevertheless, this could lead to a sense that the present
age was one of ‘decadence’ or that ‘catastrophe’ was on the horizon.71 It is this concern
about catastrophe that leads to the reformist programmes of some figures associated with
the axial age, and Jaspers, following Max Weber, sees a parallel between the educational
ambitions of Confucius and Plato in this regard.72 Of course, neither of these figures was
capable of successfully maintaining the ear of a tyrant, and the author must therefore
admit of a disconnection between the new axial figures and contemporary political
authorities. Thus, in general the cognitive revolutions of the axial age did not find
sustainable institutions and insofar as they were institutionalized they lost their dynamic
quality:
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What began as freedom of motion finally became anarchy. When the age lost its creativeness,
a process of dogmatic fixation and levelling down took place in all three cultural realms. Out
of the disorder that was growing intolerable arose a striving after new ties, through the re-
establishment of enduring conditions.73
Thus, Jaspers seems to suggest that the radical demythologization which he associates
with the axial age led ultimately to the breakdown of society. In reconstituting itself,
society adopted some of the traits of the older major civilizations and produced
expansive and highly organized empires.74 While these new social formations lacked
the cultural inventiveness of their predecessors, they maintained a ‘relation to the spirit
of what had gone before’.75 Unlike the previous civilizations, then, those that emerged
in the wake of the axial age are marked by ‘spiritual tension’. In these civilizations the
imperial form returns explicitly: it enables social stability ‘in the form of conscious
despotism … merely to preserve a culture in icy rigidity’.76 Thus, the achievements of
the axial age were already held up as ‘a model and an object of veneration’,77
undoubtedly due to their ‘purity … clarity, ingeniousness and freshness’.78 For
Jaspers, the axial age has become a kind of mine for the subsequent developments in
world history. ‘In each new upward flight it [humankind] returns in recollection to this
period and is fired anew by it’.79
The actuality of axiality
The two key traits associated with the axial age are transcendence and critique.
Transcendence seems to imply individuals capable of reflexive thinking, whereas critique
is linked to progressive demythologization or rationalization and a tension between
worldviews. Nevertheless, it has been shown, albeit in a piecemeal fashion, that many
of the ways in which Jaspers describes these different characteristics cannot convincingly
be applied to all of the axial zones. A case in point would seem to be the central idea of
transcendence, which seems ill-suited to the Chinese case. It may be argued that in such a
case that transcendence as such is not required, merely the emergence of a cosmic
principle. While this may be so, the alleged tension between the transcendent and the
immanent – the spiritual conflict that is supposed to differentiate post-axial from pre-axial
civilizations – is apparently not evident in the case of China, where ‘the sharp demarcation
between the worlds of the sacred and of the secular never does occur’.80 A second
challenge to Jaspers’s thesis is that the figure of Zoroaster seems to belong to
the second millennium BCE and hence to significantly pre-date the period in question.81
This might be hugely problematic insofar as it could be seen to undermine the parallelism
that seems important to Jaspers’s conception of the historical axis. The claim that the
emergence of transcendental reflection enabled axial figures to critically reflect on myth
such that it was reduced to parable seems not to be the case with regard to Homer, where
no such transcendence is offered.82 In Homer’s Odyssey myth becomes the material for
epic poetry. As such, the cycle of mythic fate is in some sense broken. Yet this under-
mining of myth seems to occur aesthetically, rather than through a critical purchase first
afforded by transcendence. Furthermore, the pre-eminence of Homer’s work for subse-
quent generations indicates the preponderance of the aesthetic undermining of myth for
subsequent demythologization. These three different examples show how some of
Jaspers’s definitions are ill-suited to the content, how some of the content indicates a
broader temporal spectrum, and how the relationship between his concepts could be
conceived differently.
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 323
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ad
bo
ud
 U
niv
ers
ite
it N
ijm
eg
en
] a
t 0
7:2
0 2
4 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
It may nonetheless be possible to defend Jaspers’s characterization of the axial age. It
could be that although the plurality of worldviews that emerged at this time cannot be
united under dominant characteristics that each share in common, there are nevertheless
many shared features such that it would be possible to construct some form of conceptual
constellation or family resemblances by which to characterize the age. The fundamental
idea of the axial age as an era in which a whole host of cognitive orientations that claimed
universal validity emerged and thereby broke with the mythic past would provide
sufficient ground. Unity would reside in the fact of plurality. This is already apparent in
Jaspers’s assurance that the different figures ‘all belong together, however much they
differ from each other’.83
Nevertheless, in asserting the unity of these emergent worldviews in such a fashion,
Jaspers does little more than gesticulate. He does not provide a robust philosophical or
sociological justification. In this sense, asides from coining the term ‘axial age’, he does
not move beyond those other thinkers who have preceded him. Indeed, although Jaspers is
dismissive because Lasaulx provides ‘not an explanation’ but ‘merely a paraphrase of the
mystery’, little more can be attributed to his own position.84 Hence, he speaks candidly of
‘the enigma’ and ‘the mystery’.85 He rebuts any suggestion that his discussion might
allude to divine intervention ‘without saying so directly’. But he does so not only because
it would entail a leap into ‘pseudo knowledge’, but also ‘an importunity against the
deity’!86 Shortly thereafter he refers to the deity again, in a manner that seems to contra-
dict his previous statement. This occurs in the context of explaining how the ‘historical
fact of the threefold origin’ creates tricky boundaries for communication.87 For Jaspers
moving beyond such boundaries ‘into boundless communication’ is the ‘secret of being
human’ because it prevents dogmatism:
The claim to exclusive possession of the truth… that disaster for the West – most intensely so
in its secularised forms, such as the dogmatic philosophies and the so-called scientific
ideologies – can be vanquished by the very fact that God has manifested himself historically
in several fashions and has opened up many ways towards Himself. It is as though the deity
were issuing a warning, through the language of universal history, against the claim to
exclusiveness in the possession of the truth.88
It is hardly worth noting why a doctrine regarding the plural manifestation of God will not
vanquish such scientistic foes. Nevertheless, the term ‘as though’ suggests a fictive or
metaphorical device at play.
There is no evidence to suggest that Jaspers was a religious believer.89 He nevertheless
identifies philosophy with faith, albeit faith conceived of as openness to being and a non-
dogmatic striving. The corresponding notion of truth is one which is never fully amenable
to either philosophical or religious explication, it is subjective: ‘Philosophical faith …
looks on all formulated and written philosophy only as preparation or recollection, only as
inspiration or confirmation …: it cannot become a credo’.90 His definition of ‘unbelief’ is
telling: ‘any attitude that asserts absolute immanence and denies transcendence’.91
Nevertheless, even unbelief can be the starting point of belief: ‘Transcendence seems to
be accessible by all roads’.92 It is in this context that one can understand his conception of
a ‘perennial philosophy’. For Jaspers, the heroic individuals who make up the history of
philosophy and the great religious traditions – though Buddha and Jesus are classed
amongst The Great Philosophers93 – are united in that they each wrestle with a transcen-
dent truth. While philosophers ‘strive to apprehend eternal truth … the complete truth is
not objectively accessible in time’.94 The plurality of religious and philosophical ideas
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presents kaleidoscope visions of an essentially incommensurable truth which authentic
thinking forever circles. In this regard, Jaspers’s religious philosophy stands in contrast to
an a la carte deism, which he associates with the Enlightenment:
The Enlightenment sought to find the true religion by assembling the best from all religions.
The result however was not the authentic truth, purified of historical accident, but a collection
of abstractions watered down by rationalism. The source of this universal faith was only a
critical, measuring intelligence. The profound meaning, the poignancy was lost. Trivial
generalizations remained.95
To return then to the problematic reference to God, it can be said that Jaspers’s claim
regarding God’s historical manifestation is merely another way of expressing this
constitutively transcendent conception of truth that all authentic philosophy purportedly
circles. Something similar occurs in Heidegger’s 1935 lectures on metaphysics, where
it is claimed ‘that in the history of philosophy all thinkers have at bottom said the same
thing’.96 Nevertheless, it is questionable how valuable Jaspers’s philosophy of history
is if its core is premised on an unchanging yet opaque metaphysical truth as ‘an
inexhaustible stream that flows from the history of philosophy as a whole from
China to the West, yet flows only when the primal source is captured for new
realizations in the present’.97
Jaspers criticizes Hegel’s philosophy of history for its unwarranted leaps in region and
time98 – the underlying problem being Hegel’s reliance on a metaphysical macrosubject,
world-spirit. Yet if Jaspers himself relies on metaphysics and in the process loses the key
Hegelian advance, namely, thinking historical change, one may ask whether the pluralist
gain is worth the new metaphysical promissory note. If true philosophical insight cannot
ultimately be represented, it is little wonder that the revolutions in worldviews associated
with the axial age fail to be institutionalized: ‘The axial period too ended in failure.
History went on’.99
Even if one can swallow the idea that the unity of the axial age concept lies in the
plurality of its manifestations and can choke down the attendant metaphysics, there are
still problems regarding the very structure that the axial age is meant to take. As has
already been said, Jaspers wishes to break with the Christian basis of traditional
approaches to the philosophy of history. He does so while nevertheless maintaining the
Christian temporal framework of a radical break with the past which sets all the coordi-
nates for future developments. Yet this is a theological conception of the event as a
revelatory rupture; one that is substantially shaped by the historical realities facing the
early Christians. The wilful closing of the axial age 200 years BC further disguises what is
already hidden in plain sight: that the axial age is a ‘secularized version of the Christian
opposition of true religion and paganism or historia sacra and historia profana’.100 For
Assmann, this reiteration can be seen not only in how the theory ‘dramatizes a tendency, a
development, a process of emergence in the form of a revolutionary break’, but also
because it ‘personifies it in the figure of a great individual’.101 Given the problem of
particularism which Jaspers associates with the traditional (Christian) philosophy of
history, it remains to be seen why others should accept a crypto-Christian narrative.
The problem is not just that it echoes Christianity and will therefore encounter
resistance from those who hold to other beliefs, but that in doing so it misrepresents
historical reality. Thus, for Assmann, ‘Jaspers seems to be blind to truly axial features in
pre-axial civilizations’.102 Elsewhere Assmann has revealed how the Egyptian ruler,
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Akhenaten anticipates Moses by making a monotheistic claim that distinguishes between
false gods and a true one:
for Akhenaten, the fact that the totality of reality could be reduced to the workings of light
and time made all the other deities appear as inert, superfluous, fictitious and false …
Akhenaten was thus the first in the history of mankind to apply the distinction between
true and false to religion.103
Bellah also points to Akhenaten’s new religion as a ‘precursor of the axial revolu-
tion’ and suggests that the disappearance of such beliefs after his death result from
his revolution being too exclusive, with ‘neither priest, nor prophets, nor a people to
continue in the faith’.104 Nevertheless, Assmann provides numerous other ways in
which Egypt anticipates some of the axial developments and suggests that the same
is undoubtedly true of ancient Mesopotamia.105 In denying Egypt any role in his
considerations of the axial age Jaspers acquiesces with a Greek prejudice: ‘Hellenistic
Greeks preferred the fanciful images of an eternal Egypt to the Egyptian thought of
their time’.106 The view of historical phenomena that accords significance to that
which survives, seems close to a kind of positivistic theodicy; a justification of what
exists because it exists. At the very least it overlooks the manner in which the past is
the site of ideological struggle, that it is constructed by subsequent generations, by
‘the victor’.107
The problems of the ‘age’
In his lectures on mythology, Schelling warns us that due to a lack of a ‘true, that is,
internal difference’ separating the historical from the pre-historical, it is not possible to
assert a boundary between them. He continues by referring this problem of origins directly
to the project of universal history: ‘No one is able to say where the historical time begins
and the other ends, and those compiling Universal History are in a noticeable difficulty
about the point with which they should begin’.108 With his concept of the axial age,
Jaspers hopes to assert a universal point to which all subsequent developments can be
traced. But historical phenomena are Janus faced and never fully available to us.
‘Antiquity’, Assmann reminds us, ‘is much more than the not yet of modernity’.109 As
has been shown, Assmann suggests that the idea of the axial age can be pushed back to
incorporate earlier events in Egypt. It has also been said that if Jaspers wishes to include
Zoroaster, the period would have to be broadened. The exclusion of Christianity and Islam
has also been seen as problematic by numerous authors.110 In fact, as Peter Wagner has
emphasized, theorists with specific historical or sociological expertise have tended to
dissolve the idea of the axial age both by highlighting the diversity of the different
traditions involved and by expanding its historical range.111 His suggestion is that instead
of conceiving of a singular break dividing pre-history from history proper, the notion of an
age should be dropped altogether in favour of ‘axial transformations’, which would also
include modern events such as the French Revolution.112 Such moments of transformation
mark important passages in cultural evolution, but their significance should not be
conceived in terms of a singular event, because it only acquires this status as they are
institutionalized and passed on and recounted in cultural memory. In an important sense,
Jaspers himself is trying to reconfigure this memory in the wake of historical catastrophe
by appealing to a shared origin of modernity in order to emphasize the potential of a
shared goal.
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In spite of this, the metaphysical conception of transcendent truth to which Jaspers
ascribes seems to blind him to the historical factors determining his own interest in the
figures of the axial age. He conceives of the axial age figures as heroic individuals; they
dare to reach out into the void, to transcend. In an early article on Jaspers, Habermas has
shown that this heroic conception of the individual philosopher leads to ‘a historicity
without history’.113 Habermas claims that a reflexive awareness of our own situatedness is
necessary for us to connect with such figures, if they are not to become mere historical
content interpreted arbitrarily. At the same time, shorn of its social context, the over-
emphasis on individuality loses sight of the ‘normative content’ of their positions.114
Having examined some of the divergences between the axial age figures, it now seems
clear that it is only by stripping them of their historical specificity and positing notions
associated with his own existential philosophy that Jaspers is able unite these figures
under the concept of the axial age. Arnason articulates this issue clearly, noting that
Jasper’s descriptions are too ‘reminiscent of his own version of existential philosophy; he
seems, in other words, to impose an anachronistic and uniformitarian model on historical
experience that should first be analysed with all due allowance for diversity’.115 Thus, the
very pluralist vision that Jaspers is correct to emphasize in the wake of the Second World
War is threatened by the anachronistic, if not ahistorical, tendencies of his own thought.
Although scholars have sought to overcome Jaspers’s problematic account of the axial
age and to develop an account that is more reflexive as regards its own normative
presuppositions and more sensitive to the diversity of historical materials, the idea of
the axial age as a single demythologizing turn has persisted. In his reconstruction of
Weber’s account of religious rationalization, Habermas indicates that the process of
religious rationalization still retained an element of myth in that the central cosmological,
theological or ontological axiom that afforded a position of critical transcendence was not
itself open to criticism.116 In his more recent turn to religion, Habermas speaks of this as a
mythic core that inheres in religious beliefs and necessitates their translation into a more
generally accessible language. Although his earlier reading of Weber affords him a more
nuanced view of the rationalization processes, Habermas has frequently referred to the
axial age as a ‘revolution in worldviews’,117 which following Jaspers, he conceives as a
‘cognitive breakthrough’ [kognitiver Durchbruch].118 He claims that between ‘800 and
300 BCE’. it is possible to identify the emergence of ‘universalistic structures of con-
sciousness’ and ‘rationalized world pictures’ in the emergence of axial worldviews in
China, Greece, India and Israel.119 Central to Habermas’s recent work is the claim that
religious traditions ‘involve semantic potentials capable of exercising an inspirational
force on society as a whole as soon as they divulge their profane truth contents’.120 He
thinks this is possible through translation as a process of non-destructive secularization.
Significantly this means he wants to treat the axial age as a period that is determinative of
religions that are translatable:
An unexhausted semantic potential, assuming that such exists, can be found only in those
traditions which, although their mythic kernel was transformed into a thinking of transcen-
dence through the cognitive advance of the axial age, nevertheless have not yet completely
dissolved in the relentless acceleration of modern conditions of life.121
The idea of the axial age as a historical period thus continues to play an important role in
Habermas’s thought. This is problematic due to the kind of triumphalism that is inherent
in Jaspers’s articulation of the axial age: ‘The prehistoric peoples remain prehistoric until
they merge into the historical movement that proceeds from the axial age, or die out’.122
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The normative function of the axial age can be questioned because, like any identity
claim, it exhibits an exclusionary logic. Hence, Habermas also refers to the period as a
line of demarcation in order to exclude philosophical positions that lack a reference to
transcendence, which he labels ‘neo-pagan’.123 This would seem problematic not only
because the very structure of a revolutionary break seems to owe its roots to Christian
rhetoric, but also because of the difficulty that has been seen in any attempt to create
something like an epoch out of the diverse manifestations associated with the axial age.
Conclusion
In its original articulation, Jaspers’s axial age thesis is riddled with problems. These
problems stem from his failure to link up his more general conception of the age with
an examination of the texts to which he refers. In this light, his claim to provide an
empirical basis for universal history appears unsubstantiated. The very diversity of the
sources to which he appeals seems to contradict the unity of the age. Jaspers can only
unite such thinkers by drawing on ahistorical notions of truth from his own existential
philosophy. It has also been shown that historical research would dissolve the assumed
unity by pointing to earlier and later developments that seems to share some of the
features ascribed to the axial age. To be sure, those ages whose unity is constructed by
theoretical reflection, such as the Renaissance, are prone to being challenged by historical
analysis. In the case of the axial age this is even more problematic because the supposed
unity is already a very loose one in spatiotemporal terms: it covers a huge geographical
distance, includes areas that had no contact with one another and spans a period of six
hundred years. The very division between a ‘before’ and an ‘after’ that Jaspers’s concep-
tion of the axial age utilizes draws on the semantics of the Christian historiography he
sought to disavow. It has also been suggested that it implies a certain triumphalism in this
regard. Yet if the axial age cannot be contained within a specific period, if its manifesta-
tions are diverse and cannot be united without recourse to metaphysics, and if its temporal
structure is itself a transposition of Christian revelation, it does not seem to provide us
with much of a theory. At best, the axial age can be seen as shorthand for a series of
developments in cognitive orientation that share some similarities and exhibit many
differences. Still, Habermas’s recent deployment of the term has shown that even a
philosopher with a profound grasp of social theory, a post-metaphysical outlook and a
wariness for the philosophy of history can become ensnared in the seeming simplicity of
this narrative. Rejecting Jaspers’s thesis as incoherent does not mean denying the integral
role the religious traditions to which he refers have played in the historical development of
reason. Nor does it mean that such traditions will not continue to play a decisive role in
shaping the moral intuitions of modern and increasingly secularized countries. Nor,
finally, does it mean that the attempt to relate these different developments in comparative
sociology is not a useful enterprise. Yet it should act as a warning against ambitious
philosophical claims concerning universal history. If philosophy is part of a multifaceted
process of demythologization, then it serves its function best by critically opposing myths,
not creating new ones.
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1. For example: Boy and Torpey, ‘Inventing the Axial Age’; Bellah and Joas, Axial Age and Its
Consequences; and Habermas, Nachmetaphysisches Denken II. Bellah, Religion in Human
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4. Habermas has Huntington’s thesis in mind in his acceptance speech for the 1995 Karl Jaspers
Prize. Habermas, ‘The Conflict of Beliefs.‘
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6. Ibid., 8–9 and 16–7.
7. Ibid., 8–9.
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9. Ibid., 15.
10. Joas, ‘The Axial Age Debate’, 14.
11. Sheehan, ‘The Altars of the Idols’, 660–2.
12. Assmann, The Price of Monotheism, 121 n.3. Albeit axial avant la lettre.
13. Assmann and Joas both refer to an article by Dietrich Metzler, see ibid. Joas, ‘The Axial Age
Debate’, 11. Textual analysis indicates that the language and social setting of parts of
Zoroaster’s writing are much older than this, circa 1200 BCE. So Zoroaster might not stand
within the axial boundaries at all. (This claim is to be revisited.)
14. As he grandiloquently states: ‘When Max Weber died in 1920, it was for me as though the
world had changed. The great man, who had justified its existence to my consciousness and
had given it a soul (and meaning) was no longer with us’. Jaspers, ‘Philosophical
Autobiography’, 30. Dieter Heinrich has claimed that ‘the philosophy of Jaspers originated
in the life and death of Max Weber’. Quoted in Adair-Toteff, ‘Max Weber as Philosopher’,
17.
15. Boy and Torpey, ‘Inventing the Axial Age,’ 244.
16. Joas, ‘The Axial Age Debate’, 17.
17. Schuller, ‘Forward’, 11
18. Assmann, The Price of Monotheism, 121 n.3.
19. Boy and Torpey, ‘Inventing the Axial Age,’ 243.
20. Jaspers, Origin and Goal of History, 16.
21. Ibid.
22. Boy and Torpey, ‘Inventing the Axial Age,’ 243–4.
23. Assmann claims their arrival follows two waves, first around 1800 then again around
1200 BCE. ‘The first gave rise to the Hittite Empire, while the second destroyed it, and it
also put an end to the Bronze Age in general’. Assmann, ‘Cultural Memory and the
Myth’, 376.
24. The French text of the proceedings was published in 1947 and is available online. See, Benda
et al., L’Esprit Européen which can be downloaded from: http://www.rencontres-int-geneve.
ch/volumes_pdf/rig01.pdf (Last Accessed: 01.03.13). It is here that we find Jaspers’s first
reference to ‘l’époque axe’ (368).
25. See Benda et al., L’Esprit Européen, 366–7.
26. Jaspers’s quotation continues by listing some of the major players comprising this period:
‘C’est l’époque qui va d’Homère à Archimède, l’époque des grands prophètes de l’Ancien
Testament et de Zarathoustra, l’époque des Upanischades et de Bouddha, l’époque allant des
chants de Shiking, par Lao Tsé et Confucius, jusqu’à Tschang-Tseu’. Benda et al., L’Esprit
Européen, 367.
27. Jaspers, Origin and Goal of History, xv.
28. Ibid., xv.
29. ‘If human history as a whole proceeds from the One to the One, it does so in such a way that
everything accessible to us lies between these ultimate poles’. Ibid., 265.
30. Ibid., xiv.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., xv.
33. Ibid., 1
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34. Ibid. See also: ‘For the consciousness of the West, Christ is the axis of world history’. Ibid.,
58.
35. In his published radio lectures on philosophy, Jaspers appeal to Hegel in this context is more
explicit, though remains unreferenced: ‘… of the years around 500 BC Hegel has said, “All
history moves towards Christ and from Christ. The appearance of the Son of God is the axis
of history.”’ Jaspers, Way to Wisdom, 36. Joas has claimed that no equivalent to Jaspers’s
paraphrase has been found in Hegel’s work. That is, Hegel does not use the term ‘axis’ in this
sense. Joas does identify an English translation in which Hegel seems to refer to ‘the axis on
which the world turns’ in a similar context. This is not a literal translation, however, as Hegel
uses the word hinge or angle (Angel) rather than axis (Achse). See Joas, ‘The Axial Age
Debate’, 10.
36. Bearing in mind that history is the working out of freedom, this becomes almost brutally clear
in Hegel’s more conservative work. ‘The Christian religion is the religion of absolute free-
dom, and only for Christians does man count as such in his infinity and universality’. Hegel,
The Encyclopaedia Logic, 241.
37. Jaspers, Origin and Goal of History, 1.
38. Ibid., 1.
39. He refers explicitly to Confucius and Lao-tse in China; Buddah and the Upanishads in India;
Zarathustra in Iran; the prophetic tradition in the Levant; and Homer, philosophy, the
tragedians, and Thucydides in Greece. Ibid. 2.
40. Jaspers’s idea of faith is philosophical and does not directly imply religious belief. It involves
rationality, but it is not identical with positive knowledge. Bruno could not renounce his
beliefs, whereas Galileo could because the facts remained unchanged: ‘Bruno believed and
Galileo knew’. Jaspers, Perennial Scope of Philosophy, 10.
41. Assmann, ‘Cultural Memory and the Myth’, op. cit., 370.
42. Jaspers, Origin and Goal of History, 2.
43. Schwartz, ‘The Age of Transcendence’, 3.
44. Durkheim convincingly rejects the idea that fear was at the root of the most elementary forms
of religious belief (i.e. totemism). Durkheim, The Elementary Forms, 169. Nevertheless, such
feelings are apparent in subsequent mythical beliefs and magical practices. Hence, respond-
ing in a very different way to the same context in which Jaspers proposes a new universal
history, Adorno and Horkheimer view terror as a key component of primitive beliefs, which
then become transcendent: ‘The gasp of surprise which accompanies the experience of the
unusual becomes its name. It fixes the transcendence of the unknown in relation to the
known, and therefore terror to sacredness’. Adorno and Horkheimer, The Dialectic of
Enlightenment, 15. Of course, the terror that comes from facing ‘the void’ might be seen
as of a more profound kind than a more primitive senses of helplessness in the face of the
unknown. The problem may just be the existential jargon of which Jaspers makes use.
Nevertheless, the lack of examples makes it difficult to ascertain the nature of this void,
which seems absent from many of the sources.
45. Jaspers, Origin and Goal of History, 2.
46. Taylor, ‘What Was the Axial Revolution?‘ 30.
47. Ibid.
48. Bellah tries to say that there is no rational justification for the caste system, but he cannot
ignore its prevalence within the Vedic tradition. Bellah, Religion in Human Evolution, 521ff.
49. See Donald, ‘An Evolutionary Approach to Culture’, 64–75. See Table 3.3 (71) for a
comparative adumbration of the different features of each cognitive regime. For a more
general situating of religion in human evolution see: Bellah, Religion in Human Evolution. A
similar distinction is already apparent in Cassirer, who speaks of the historical development
of cognition through mimetic, analogical, and symbolic phases. See Cassirer, Philosophy of
Symbolic Forms, 190.
50. Bellah, ‘What Is Axial,’ 79.
51. Jaspers, Origin and Goal of History, 2.
52. It could of course be argued that figures in the prophetic tradition take up ethical positions not
previously assumed and come into conflict with existing societal norms. Nevertheless, this
does not suggest a discursive field within which different legitimate prophets reach different
positions and disagree with one another.
53. Ibid.
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62. Ibid., 297.
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72. Ibid., 5. Cf.: ‘From Confucius, in whose temple even the emperor makes his obeisance,
graded transitions lead to Plato. But both of them were [sic] simply a teacher of a school of
philosophy, who differed chiefly in that Confucius was centrally concerned with influencing
princes in the direction of particular social reforms, and Plato only occasionally’. Weber, The
Sociology of Religion, 53.
73. Jaspers, Origin and Goal of History, 5.
74. He cites the Tsin Shi hwang-ti in India, the Maurya dynasty in India, and the Hellenistic and
Roman empires in the West. Ibid.
75. Ibid., 6.
76. Ibid., 7.
77. Ibid., 6.
78. Ibid., 76.
79. Ibid., 7.
80. Schwartz, ‘The Age of Transcendence’, 6.
81. Assmann, ‘Cultural Memory and the Myth’, 398–9.
82. It is perhaps for this reason that Dreyfus and Kelly ignore Jaspers’s inclusion of Homer and
contrast Homeric polytheism with the subsequent monotheism. See: Dreyfus and Kelly,
‘Saving the Sacred,’ 197. Whereas their retrieval of polytheism, which seems to be a curious
mix of Hölderlin and self-help, is not the position defended here, the opposition of Homer to
the axial age that they enact is instructive insofar as it highlights a tension within Jaspers’s
concept. Robert Bellah excludes Homer (and Zoroaster) on largely sociological grounds.
Bellah, Religion in Human Evolution, 271 and 327.
83. Jaspers, Origin and Goal of History, 3.
84. Ibid., 15.
85. Ibid., 13, 15, 16 and 18.
86. Ibid., 18.
87. Ibid., 19.
88. Ibid., 19–20.
89. Joas, ‘The Axial Age Debate’, 22.
90. Jaspers, Perennial Scope of Philosophy, 15.
91. Ibid., 116.
92. Ibid., 141.
93. Jaspers, Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus.
94. Jaspers, Perennial Scope of Philosophy, 150.
95. Ibid. 110. This seems to echo Hegel’s famous claim regarding the pyrrhic victory ensuing
from the confrontation between enlightenment reason and faith. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge,
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55. What seems absent in Jaspers’s account is the dialectical awareness that such a process
transforms both terms.
96. He continues in a manner that reminds us of Jaspers – ironic given the infamy of certain
portions of this text and the context of Jaspers’s axial age thesis – by extolling the
essential wonder proper to the philosophical attitude: ‘Everything has already been said.
And yet this ‘same’ possesses, as its inner truth, the inexhaustible wealth of that which
on every day is as if that day were its first’. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics,
102–3.
97. Jasper, Perennial Scope of Philosophy, 26.
98. Jaspers, Origin and Goal of History, 10.
99. Ibid., 20.
100. Assmann, ‘Cultural Memory and the Myth,’ 375.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid., 376.
103. Assmann, ‘Axial Breakthrough in Ancient Egypt’, 143.
104. Utilizing Assmann’s work, Bellah claims that Akhenaten ‘declared that all gods but Aten
were false; he raised the criterion of truth and falsehood in a way that drove a dagger into the
heart of traditional Egyptian religion’. Bellah, ‘What Is Axial’, 82.
105. Assmann, ‘Cultural Memory and the Myth’, 382ff.
106. Momigliani, Alien Wisdom, 4. Later, on the other hand, one finds Clement claiming that
Greek philosophy ‘borrowed’ from Egyptian wisdom. See Stroumsa, ‘Cultural Memory in
Early Christianity’, 314.
107. Benjamin, ‘Theses’, 256.
108. Schelling, Critical Introduction to the Philosophy, 161.
109. Assmann, ‘Cultural Memory and the Myth’, 401.
110. Arnason, Eisenstadt, and Wittrock, ‘General Introduction’, op. cit., 3.
111. Wagner, ‘Palomer’s Question’, op. cit., 90.
112. Ibid., 103.
113. Habermas, Philosophical-Political Profiles, 46.
114. Ibid., 49.
115. Arnason, ‘Axial Age and Its Interpreters,’ 31–2.
116. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, 214.
117. Habermas et al., An Awareness of What is Missing, 82.
118. Habermas, Nachmetaphysisches Denken II, 29.
119. Habermas, ‘Zum Thema’, 349.
120. Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, 142.
121. Habermas et al., An Awareness of What is Missing, 77–8 (emphasis added).
122. Jaspers, Origin and Goal of History, 8. The levels of suffering from domination, violence and
disease that were caused by the colonial projects of axial civilizations should sober any such
triumphalism. Furthermore, it was gunpowder and not the Gorgias that facilitated the
conquest of new territories, and this was probably introduced to the West from China by
the non-axial Mongols, whose world shaping influence might thus further undermine the
thesis.
123. See Allen, ‘Having One’s Cake and Eating It Too.’
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